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I 
IAs I use the term a proposition is anything that can be 

asserted, assumed, conjectured, stated~ believed, etc. It is 

not something that can be asked, order~d, requested, etc. 

, 
On certain occasions of its use a!given sentence expresses 
a proposition, on other occasions it does not do so. For example, 
if an assertion, report, conjecture, etc. is made by uttering "It 
is raining," then that sentence would have expressed a proposi­
tion. If it is uttered as part of a jJke, or in quoting, or by a 
parrot, no proposition would have been I expressed. (One might ob­
ject to applying "expresses a proposition" to sentences on the 
grounds that sentences cannot literally express anything. This is 
true, but it does not pose any signifidant problem. Simply regard
I 
"The sentence x expresses a proposition" as shorthand for "The 
speaker S expresses a proposition by producing the sentence x.")
- ! 
I hope these preliminary remarks make clear what I understand 
I 
by the terms "proposition" and "expresses a proposition." In this 
paper I examine the concept of expressing a proposition, confining 
my attention just to those cases where1x is produced as a complete 
sentence (not as part of another sente~ce). I do not try to give
I 
an analysis of the concept here; but Ido try to provide some 
groundwork for a successful analysis b¥ making distinctions and 
clarifying problems. I 
I 
Suppositions and Truth-Claims. T~e ways in which proposi­
tions. are expressed can be divided into two mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive classes. The distinction Ilhave in mind holds between 
(a) producing a sentence to make an assumption, or conjecture, 
etc., and (b) producing a sentence to ~ake an assertion, or state­
ment, etc. I shall label the distinction by saying that in a case 
falling under (a) the speaker made a supposition, while in a case 
I •falling under (b) the speaker made a truth-clalm. 
I 
I think that this distinction can: be best explained by point­
ing out that it never makes sense to s~y that a speaker spoke 
honestly or dishonestly in a case in which he made a supposition. 
These terms are only applicable to trufh-claims. 
This is especially clear in the case of assumptions. Suppose 
for example, that ~ produces, "Smith w~s in Chicago at the time of 
the murder," and then adds. "For the time being I shall simply 
accept this for the sake of the argume~t.fI Clearly it would be 
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senseless to ask if S liedjor spoke honestly when he produced his 
premise. The same is true;of conjectures. Suppose S produces, 
liMy guess is that the book 'cost five dollars" in response to H'S 
request that S guess how m~ch the book cost. Now I do not deny 
that ~ might have lied in ~aying he was guessing. But if he was 
honest in saying this, the~ he did make a conjecture that the 
book cost five dollars. And it would be senseless to call this 
conjecture a lie or an honelst conjecture. In other words, if S 
was honest in saying that h.e was guessing, then there are two 
different speech-acts he performed by uttering his sentence. He 
made a conjecture that the book cost five dollars, and an honest 
truth-claim that he was gue~sing that this was the case. If he 
lied in making the truth-claim. he made no conjecture at all. 
I 
I do not know how I ca~ prove that the terms "honest" and 

tldishonest" are not applica~le to suppositions, but there is an 

objection to this claim whiyh I wish to consider. Suppose that 

in response to H's question,"Who called last night?" ~ replies 

"It was Smith" while only guessing that it was Smith who called. 

Let us suppose that S neithJr believes nor disbelieves this. He 

realizes that it could have ,been Smith or anyone of ten other 

people, but in order that ~Iwill not bother him about the matter 

he produces his reply. Now~ made a conjecture in saying that 

it was Smith who called. but there is clearly a sense in which 

this conjecture was dishones,t. For in producing his words in a 

normal tone of voice he ind~cated to H that he believed it was 

Smith while believing nothing
; 
of the kind. 

i 
In reply to this object~on I wish to deny that ~ made a con­
jecture. He made a truth-claim. To make a conjecture that P it 
is not enough that one merelyI say that! while guessing that - R is 
the case. The speaker must also be entitled to believe that his 
audience understands that he l is merely guessing. That is, he must 
either say he is guessing orithere must be other factors concern­
ing the context which entitle the speaker to take his audience to 
understand that he is guessing. 
Honest truth-claims. T~e existence of suppositions shows 
that it is not the case that;on every occasion upon which a propo­
sition is expressed the speaker speaks honestly or dishonestly. 
The question naturally arise~ as to whether every truth-claim is 
either honest or dishonest. II shall approach this question by 
considering some problems which face any attempt to give an ade­
quate explanation of what it lis to make an honest truth-claim. 
A necessary condition fdr a speaker S to make an honest truth­
claim P by producing a sentence x is that-S believe P when he ut­
ters!i-: This is not a suffic[ient conditio);'. however-: For suppose 
it is raining at time ~ in thF general vicinity of 1. At this time 
and place S. while reading aloud to someone from a novel, produces 
"It is rai);'ing." Now ~ may w¢ll have believed that it was raining 
when he uttered the sentence,! but he made no truth-claim at all. 
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Notice, however, that in this case the speaker S could not 
be said to have intended to get the hearer:.!.! to believe that it 
was raining by uttering his sentence (or if he had such an inten­
tion this would be a reason for saying that he did make an honest 
truth-claim.) This fact might lead one to! say that S produces x 
to make an honest truth-claim P if, and oniy if, S believes P when 
he produces x, and produces x with the int~ntion of getting Hto 
believe P. This equivalence~ however, does not hold. Suppose a 
child asks ~ to explain why the world is rbund. ~ replies, "The 
reason that the world is round is that the differential of the ab­
solute value of the length of the equator is zero." SIS purpose 
in replying to this question with a nonsen~e sentence-is to get 
the child to believe ~ is an intelligent person. ~ might also be­
lieve this, but he made no truth-claim. I 
I 
Grice proposes an analysis of what he, calls "nonnatural mean­
ing": 'If A meant something by 2!,f is (rough~y) equivalent to I A 
intended the utterance of x to produce som~ effect in an audience 
by means of the recognition of this intention.'" (Grice, 1957:385). 
I think it is partially because of example~ like the one just 
described that Grice employs "by means of ,the recognition of this 
intention" in formulating his analysis. Pf'!rhaps something similar 
can be done in this case. Suppose we say that S makes an honest 
truth-claim P by producing x if, and only lf, S-believes P when he
- - ,- ­produces x, and produces x with the intention of getting H to be­
lieve P by means of H's recognition of thi~ intention. This 

analysis, I believe,-is immune to ,
the previous counterexamples. 

But it still is inadequate since there are other cases which do 

not satisfy it. 

Let us suppose that Smith has great c~ntempt for political 
and ethical discussions. He walks into a koom where some friends 
are having a heated discussion over Kissinger's policy toward 
Vietnam. Jones asks Smith, "Tell us Smith~ what is your attitude 
toward Kissinger's policy?" To this Smithl retorts, "I think that 
policy demonstrates the falsity of Goldbach's conjecture." Smith 
may well have intended his utterance to in~uce a belief in his 
audience that he has great contempt for such questions by means 
of his audience's recognition of this inte~tion. Also, of course, 
Smith could himself have this belief when pe uttered the sentence. 
Here is another counterexample. Suppose S~ith makes a sincere and 
nondefective promise by uttering "I promise to be at the meeting." 
Smith would have intended to induce a beli,bf that he will be at 
the meeting in his audience by means of his audience's recognition 
of this intention. And he also would havel this belief. But he 
did not make any truth-claim at all. Simillar remarks hold in the 
case of a man who issues a sincere and nonpefective warning by 
uttering "I warn you that I shall be at the meeting." 
I 
Suppose that the notion of a sentencei which is conventionally 
used to produce the belief that P could be defined in such a way 
that the last three sentences cited would not be sentences which 
are conventionally used to produce the bellefs that these sentences 
lit 
l 

However, there is a problem with this approach. I ask Smith, 

"What does IEs regnet l mean?": Smith replies, "It is raining." 

Clearly Smith made an honest truth-claim that "E s regnet" means 

"It is raining." But would "It is raining" be a sentence which is 

conventionally used to produce I such a belief? This, of course, 

depends upon how one I _ tois to define "x is conventionally used ~ produce the belief that P." The point is that I do not know how
'i this concept can be defined so;as to (i) prevent "I promise to beI at the meeting" from being a sentence which is conventionally used) 
to produce the belief that thelspeaker will be at the meeting, 
while (ii) allowing "It is rairiing" to be a sentence which is con­
ventionally used to produce thy belief that liEs' regnet" means "It 
is raining." 
Logical priority. Complications of this sort do not show 
that any attempt to define "x is used to make an honest truth­
claim p" in terms of "intends to induce the belief that pIt is 
- Ifutile. But they do show that~in order for such an attempt to be 
successful some restrictions must be made with respect to assign­
ing values to x and P. 
I shall say that a sentence x is logically prior to a sen­
tence y with respect to a propqsition P if and only if (i) one can 
understand how x can be used tq make the truth-claim that P with­
out understanding how y can be:used to make the same claim, but 
(ii) to understand how y can b~ used to make the truth-claim that 
P one must understand how x can be used to make the same claim. 
For example, ,It Es regnet"-means' It is raining' II is logically 
prior to "It is raining" with 11espect to the proposition that liEs 
regnet" means "It is raining." "He is intelligent" is logically 
prior to "He has a head on his shoulders" with respect to the 
proposition that the man singl~d out is intelligent. I shall say 
that a sentence x is standard with respect to a proposition P if, 
and only if, x is logically prior to some other sentence y with 
respect to this proposition and no other sentence z is logically 
prior to x with respect to the ;proposition P. For-example, "It is 
raining" is standard with resp~ct to the proposition that it is 
raining now. But the sentence is not standard with respect to the 
proposition that "Es regnet" means "It is raining." 
i 
My proposal for dealing w~th the counterexamples is to employ 
the concept that has just been introduced so as to restrict the 
ranges of x and P in the formu]a ItS uses x to make an honest and 
- - Iprimary truth-claim P." What I have in mind is the following 
emendation: In a case in whic~ a speaker S produces a sentence x 
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COUl~ then amendwere used to produce. We the analysis by adding 
a third condition to the effect that the sentence the speaker 
uttered must be one which is cpnventionally used to produce the 
belief which the speaker intended to induce in his audience. 
Since the sentences cited in tpe preceding three cases would not 
satisfy this condition, these tases would no longer be counter­
examples. I 
-:-----_ ...._-.­
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which is standard with respect to the proposition P, S uses x to 
make an honest and primary truth-claim P ifJ and only-if S be­
lieves P when he produces and S utters xiwith the intention of 
getting ~ to believe P. 
One cannot argue that the cases in which "I think that policy 
demonstrates the falsity of Goldbach's conjecture," "I promise to 
be at the meeting" and "I warn you that I shall be at the meeting" 
were produced are counterexamples to the present analysis since 
none of these sentences are standard with respect to any proposi­
tion at all. Notice also that the phrase "by means of H's recog­
nition of this intention" has been dropped. I Without the restric­
tions on ~ and K it was necessary to add this condition because it 
is possible to utter a nonsense sentence to i get someone to believe, 
say, that the speaker is intelligent. But since a nonsense sep­
tence is not standard with respect to any proposition, this possi­
bility poses no problem for the restricted analysis. 
A final emendation. Of course, a com~lete account of what it 
is to make an honest truth-claim would requfre an account of cases 
in which an honest truth-claim P is made by Ithe production of a 
sentence which is not standard with respect Ito P. But before this 
problem can be considered the account just given of standard cases 
needs revision. . 
Consider the following counterexample.1 A suspect is being 

interrogated by a detective. After a few hours the suspect comes 

to believe that the detective is convinced of his guilt, and that 

nothing he can say is going to change the detective's mind. None­

theless, in response to a certain line of questioning the suspect 

utters "I'm innocent" assertively. Suppose ,that in fact the sus­

pect is innocent. Then he would have made an honest truth-claim 

that he was innocent of the crime in questidn. But he could not 

be construed as having intended to induce this belief in the de­

tective, since he did not think that there Jas any chance of the 

detective believing him. I 

It is not difficult to construct otherj counterexamples which 
are perhaps less unusual than the one just described. It is, for 
example, quite possible for a speaker to gi~e an honest answer to 
a question without in the least bit caring if the person who asked 
the question believes him. And if a man does not care if he is 
believed, he does not have the requisite intlention. 
I 
The problems raised by such cases can ibe met by the following 
(final) emendation. Given that x is standard with respect to P, S 
makes an honest truth-claim P by-producing xl if, and only if, (1)­
S believes P when he produce~ x, and eitherl (2) S produces x with 
the intention of getting some hearer H to beilieve P, or (3)-in the 
event that E. does not have this intention hel is not justified in 
taking 
-
H to be aware of this fact. A restricted analysis of a 
I dishonest truth-claim can be given in the sa~e way by substituting 
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ItS does not believe P when he produces x" for (1). (The reason for 
ha-;ing condition (3) as part :of the analysis of a dishonest truth­
claim is that it is possible to make a dishonest truth-claim with­
out intending to induce a belief. The following case illustrates 
this fact. After being thre~tened with torture, a captured officer 
agrees to radio back the folrowing message to headquarters, "Our 
company is being pinned down [by enemy fire. Send reinforcements. 1I 
He goes on to give a location, thus setting up an ambush. Now in 
this case the officer clearl~ lied in saying that his company was 
being pinned down. Now suppose that the officer hopes headquarters 
will not believe him. If a person intends to do A, he either wants 
to do ~ or else he must think the doing of A is a-necessary means 
for bringing about something else which he wants. The officer does 
not want headquarters to beli!eve him, nor does he believe that get­
ting headquarters to believe bim is a necessary means for escaping 
torture. He realizes that te!lling headquarters this is what is 
necessary. So the officer ca6not be construed as having intended 
to induce a belief in his aud~ence.) 
The third condition, which is the crucial one, needs consid­
erable elaboration. Suppose 
I 
that from the other room Mrs. Smith 
asks Mr. Smith what the weather is. Mr. Smith looks out the 
window, sees that it is rainihg , and tells his wife that it is 
raining. Now suppose Mr. Smith does not care if his wife believes 
him. Then condition (2) woula fail to hold, but so far he would 
not be justified in taking hik wife to be aware of this fact. 
Suppose now the action proceeds. Mrs. Smith asks, "Are you sure? 
The forecast did not call for rain. II Mr. Smith replies, "I don't 
care if you believe me or not~ It happens to be raining." Mr. 
Smith thereby indicates to hik wife that condition (2) does not 
hold. And he is, therefore, justified in taking her to be aware 
of this fact. I 
I 
Consider the suspect-detective case again. In this case the 
suspect honestly. asserted that he was innocent of the crime in 
question, even though he did not think that there was any chance 
that the detective would believe that he was innocent. Thus, he 
did not make his assertion with the intention of getting the de­
tective to believe him. In a I I normal case in which a speaker tells 
someone that he is innocent of a crime he intends that the hearer 
believe him. For this reasonlthe suspect was not justified in 
taking the detective to be aware of the fact that condition (2) 
failed to obtain. He would have been justified if he had ample 
reason for thinking that the detective was aware of the fact that 
he (the suspect) did not think there was any chance of his being 
believed. For example, if the detective had previously said some­
thing like "Look, I know you 4re guilty. Nothing you can say will 
change my mind about that," then the suspect would have been jus­
tified in taking the detectiv~ to be aware of the fact that condi­
tion (2) did not hold. I 
Neutral truth-claims. An obvious objection now arises. Con­
sider the suspect-detective c1se again. Suppose that the detective 
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had said something which would have warranted the suspect in 
taking the detective to be aware of the fa~t that he did not make 
his assertion with the intention of gettin~ the detective to be­
lieve him. Then the case would be one in ~hich neither condition 
(2) nor condition (3) held. And yet the speaker would have made 
an honest truth-claim. I 
My answer to this objection is that there is no good reason 
for saying that the suspect made an honestltruth-claim in this 
(extended) case. I agree that a truth-claim would have been made, 
and also that it would not have been dishonestly made. It would 
follow that the speaker spoke honestly only if every truth-claim 
must be classified as either being honest or dishonest. And, as 
I shall argue, this is not the case. I 
i 
An alternative classificatory scheme,:which I shall defend. 
consists in saying that all truth-claims ate honest, dishonest or 
neutral. According to this view ~ makes alneutral truth-claim ~ 
by producing x if, and only if, S makes a truth-claim P by produc­
ing and S is justified in taking his he~rer to be aware of the 
fact that he did not intend to induce a beiief that P in the hear­
er by producing x. If one adopts this cla~sification, the revised 
suspect-detective case would not be a counterexample to the 
analysis given of an honest truth-claim, since it would be a case 
in which a neutral truth-claim is made. I 
Of the two schemes the second one is preferable. This is 

because it is easier to account for various distinctions by em­

ploying the second method of classification than it is by employ­

ing the first. There is, for example, an 6bvious distinction to 

be made between a case in which a man says Isomething which he 

knows that his hearer knows to be true, anq a case in which a man 

says something in order to convey information. If both kinds of 

cases were included under the category of honest truth-claims, 

this distinction would be blurred. And fot this reason it would 

become virtually impossible to give any sorti of acceptable 

analysis of "honest truth-claim." ! 

IConcluding remarks 
If what I have said in this paper is dorrect, I think I have 
helped to clarify certain distinctions and Iproblems which must be 
clarified before one can give a complete analysis of what it is 
to express a proposition. A sentence expr~sses a proposition on 
a particular occasion if, and only if. the Ispeaker makes a sup­
position or a truth-claim by producing it. i A truth-claim is 
either honest, dishonest or neutral. Give~ that a sentence ~ is 
standard with respect to a proposition P. ,I have tried to ex­
plain what it is for a speaker to make either an honest or dis­
honest truth-claim that P by producing x. 'Hopefully this explan­
ation could be part of a-complete analy"Sis lof "expresses a propo­
sition." As it stands the explanation given of what it is to 
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make a neutral truth-claim could not be part of such an analysis, 
since the term "truth-claim,1 was employed in giving that explana­
tion. A complete analysis Of "expresses a proposition" requires, 
first of all, an explanation of what it is for a speaker to make 
an honest or dishonest truth-claim P by producing x, where x is 
not standard with respect to Pi it also requires an analysis of 
"neutral truth-claim" witho~t-employing the term "truth-claim;" 
and, finally, it requires aJ explanation of what it is to make a 
supposition. I 
I 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I 
Grice, H. P. 1957. Meanin~. Philosophical review. LXVI:377­
388. I 
• 

